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deduction is allowable. The rule that taxing statutes must be construed in favor of the taxpayer does not apply where deductions are
concerned. Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917); Sheed v. Comm'r.,
237 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1956).
Fred Adkins

Unfair Competition-Infringement of a Trade Name
Polaroid Corporation, plaintiff, brought this action against Polaraid,
Inc., defendant, for injunctive and other relief based upon the use
by D of P's corporate name or a colorable imitation thereof in connection with D's business operation. P sought relief in a threecount complaint. The first count charged that the D infringed upon
the registered trade-mark, "Polaroid," of the P. The second count
charged the D with unfair competition in appropriating and using
as its trade name and trademark, "Polaraid," which is substantially
identical and confusingly similar to P's trade name and trademark.
The third count charged the D with violation of the Illinois Antidilution Statute. ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 140, § 22 (1959). The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois rendered
judgment for the D. P appealed. Held, reversed. Injunctive relief
was granted even if no competition existed between the parties because the resemblance of the different trade names was so close
that it would likely produce confusion. Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid,
Inc., 319 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1963).
The principal case raises the question of what must be shown to
entitle a party to injunctive relief for unfair competition. In reference to unfair competition, courts in the past have handed down
different tests to follow in determining if an injunction should be
granted.
Once the rule on trademarks took shape, business pirates thought
of new ways to take advantage of another's good-will. Equity attempted to protect the honest businessmen by developing the law of
unfair competition. At the beginning the courts found it extremely
difficult to find unfair competition between the parties where there
was no competition because most of the precedents involved a business "passing off" their goods as belonging to another and "passing
off" explained and determined most of the cases. Hence, courts
began to apply the prosposition that there could be no unfair com-
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petition unless there was actual competition between the parties.
Note, 38 HARv. L. REv. 370 (1925). The basis of the rule that
there had to be competition between the parties before there could
be unfair competition was that the plaintiff should receive no relief
unless he suffered damages, such damages generally meaning monetary loss. Where the defendant was not in actual competition with
the goods or sources of the plaintiff, there was no diversion of trade
from the plaintiff to the defendant, and without this there was no
monetary loss or damages to the plaintiff. Without a monetary loss
the courts could not justify granting an injunction to the plaintiff.
Annot., 148 A.L.R. 12, 19 (1944).
When the courts insist that there has to be competition between
the parties before there can be unfair competition, their only theory
must be based upon the principle that goodwill and reputation can
only be damaged by competition. This contention is untenable in
the light of human experience in that if the public is confused and
believes that the defendant's products are those of the plaintiff, or
that the plaintiff is a sponsor of the defendant, a sufficient case for
injunctive relief is presented. An adverse holding would mean that
the good-will and reputation of the plaintiff would not only depend
on itself, but also on the conduct of the defendant and the inferiority
of his products. Note, 38 HARv. L. REV. 370 (1925).
Many of the recent cases have stated that competition is no longer
the essential test. The court stated in Philadelphia Storage Battery
Co. v. Mindlin, 163 Misc. 52, 296 N.Y.S. 176 (Sup. Ct. 1937) that
two products need not be competitive before an injunction can be
granted. The word "unfair" rather than "competition" should be
underscored in any judicial definition of unfair competition. A false
impression may be made between the parties showing a trade relation
and this may cause injury to the plaintiff's credit and reputation.
Relief should not be denied just because there has been no actual
injury. This would deprive the equitable remedy of its most valuable
trait which is preventive justice. Also the defendant's products do
not have to be inferior in order to merit relief, for this would convert
the court into a laboratory for the testing of rival products and
claims. New competition and enterprise must not be throttled, but
the late comer should be forced to use his own orginality, rather
than misrepresentation, for his market. The court in Vogue Co. v.
Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 Fed. 509 (6th Cir. 1924) stated that
there could be unfair competition between the parties if one party
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infringed upon the trade name of the other even if the parties were
not in competition with each other. The court said there was no
fetish in the word "competition" and the invocation of equity rests
more vitally upon the unfairness.
The question remains as to what has to be shown to prove unfair
competition when there is no competition between the parties. The
emphasis in the recent cases concerning trade names and unfair
competition relates to the injury suffered by the complaining party
and the public from the confusion caused from the acts of the infringer. Under this modem view it is no longer a defense that the
defendant did not deprive the plaintiff of trade. Annot., 148 A.L.R.
12, 22 (1944).
The court stated in Household Fin. Corp. of Del. v. Household
Fin. Corp. of W. Va., 11 F. Supp. 3 (N.D. W. Va. 1935), that
to show unfair competition, it was not necessary to show that any
person has been actually deceived by defendant's conduct and led to
purchase his goods believing they were the goods of the plaintiff, or
to think he was actually dealing with the plaintiff. It was sufficient
to show that deception would be the probable result of defendant's
actions. It is a fraud to use the name or slight variation of such
name, in such a way as to induce third persons to deal with defendant
when third persons think they are dealing with the corporation that
first used the trade name.
In Certain-Teed Prod. Corp. v. Philadelphia& Suburban Mortgage
Guar. Co., 49 F.2d 114 (3d Cir. 1931) the court held that a likelihood of confusion of the public was enough to grant injunctive relief
for unfair competition. The rights of the plaintiff depend upon the
likelihood of the public confusing either the goods of the plaintiff
with the goods of the defendant, or the business of the plaintiff with
the business of the defendant. In every case where the defendant has
been restrained there has been a reasonable likelihood of confusion
existing. The court in Winery v. Goltsman & Co., 172 F. Supp. 826
(N.D. Ala. 1959) held that the test of infringement assumes there
will be an average purchaser buying in the usual manner. The court
held in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 277
F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1960) that injunctive relief would be granted in
cases where deceptively similar names are used even though there
is no actual proof of confusion. All that has to be shown is the
likelihood of confusion and that the public might be misled. The
court held in Lady Esther, Ltd. v. Lady Esther Corset Shoppe, Inc.,
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317 Ill. App. 451, 46 N.E.2d 165 (1943) that an injunction should
be granted for infringement of a trade name if the public thought
there was any connection between the plaintiff and defendant. In
Nat'l City Bank v. Nat'l City Window Cleaning Co., 180 N.E.2d 20
(Ohio 1962) the court said that the confusion may be in a rather
indefinable manner.
A mere possibility of confusion is not enough, but there must
exist a reasonable chance or a likelihood of confusion. There is
always a chance of some confusion in using the same word in different businesses. To hold such a chance sufficient, would give the
first user the absolute right to hold and control the word in any
business and any goods he desires. It must be remembered that today, with business expanding as it is, it is possible, if not probable,
that one business will make several unrelated products with the same
trade name attached to them. This shows that the real issue is not
if the customer might confuse the goods, but that the origin and
source of the goods might be confused. Annot., 148 A.L.R. 12, 63
(1944). It would seem that the difference between a "mere possibility" and a "likelihood" of confusion is a fine point in the law.
In the principal case it was shown that there need not be competition between the parties before an injunction will be granted against
unfair competition. Also, there need be no relationship between the
products in question. The plaintiff in the principal case sold photographic supplies and the defendant sold refrigeration and heating
equipment. Relief was granted because there was a likelihood of
confusion of the public and this would dilute the valuable trade
name of the plaintiff.
It would seem that the general view today is that an injunction will
be granted for infringement of a trade name even if there is no
competition between the parties. The real test in determining if
there is unfair competition is to see if the public is likely to be confused. This confusion concerns third persons thinking the products
of the defendant are those of the plaintiff or that in any way they
believe that the plaintiff and defendant operate together. There is
no certain clue for cases in determining if there is a likelihood of
confusion. The facts of each case must be weighed individually.
William Walter Smith
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